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2026-09-16 01:17:21 +05:00
commit b352a9a30d
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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6/internal/tools"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// APIKeyAuth middleware authorizes request using API key authorization.
// It first tries to use Authorization header to extract API key
// (Authorization: apikey <KEY>), then checks for api_key URL query parameter.
// If key not found or invalid then 401 response code is returned.
type APIKeyAuth struct {
key string
}
func NewAPIKeyAuth(key string) *APIKeyAuth {
return &APIKeyAuth{key: key}
}
func (a *APIKeyAuth) Middleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if a.key == "" {
log.Error().Msg("API key is empty")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
authValid := false
authHeaderValue := r.Header.Get("X-API-Key")
if authHeaderValue != "" {
if tools.SecureCompareString(a.key, authHeaderValue) {
authValid = true
}
} else {
authHeaderAuthorization := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if authHeaderAuthorization != "" {
parts := strings.Fields(authHeaderAuthorization)
if len(parts) == 2 && strings.ToLower(parts[0]) == "apikey" && tools.SecureCompareString(a.key, parts[1]) {
authValid = true
}
}
}
if !authValid && r.URL.RawQuery != "" {
// Check URL param.
if tools.SecureCompareString(a.key, r.URL.Query().Get("api_key")) {
authValid = true
}
}
if !authValid {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func testHandler() http.Handler {
fn := func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {}
return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
}
func TestAPIKeyAuthEmptyKey(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(NewAPIKeyAuth("").Middleware(testHandler()))
defer ts.Close()
res, err := http.Get(ts.URL)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusUnauthorized)
}
func TestAPIKeyAuthMissingAuthKey(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(NewAPIKeyAuth("test").Middleware(testHandler()))
defer ts.Close()
res, err := http.Get(ts.URL)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusUnauthorized)
}
func TestAPIKeyAuthXAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(NewAPIKeyAuth("test").Middleware(testHandler()))
defer ts.Close()
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "test")
res, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)
_ = res.Body.Close()
req, err = http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("x-api-key", "test")
res, err = http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)
_ = res.Body.Close()
}
func TestAPIKeyAuthAuthorizationHeader(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(NewAPIKeyAuth("test").Middleware(testHandler()))
defer ts.Close()
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "bearer test")
res, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusUnauthorized)
_ = res.Body.Close()
req, err = http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "test")
res, err = http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusUnauthorized)
_ = res.Body.Close()
req, err = http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "apikey test test")
res, err = http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusUnauthorized)
_ = res.Body.Close()
req, err = http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "apikey test")
res, err = http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)
_ = res.Body.Close()
}
func TestAPIKeyAuthQueryParam(t *testing.T) {
ts := httptest.NewServer(NewAPIKeyAuth("test").Middleware(testHandler()))
defer ts.Close()
res, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"?api_key=t", "application/json", nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusUnauthorized)
_ = res.Body.Close()
res, err = http.Post(ts.URL+"?api_key=test", "application/json", nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, res.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)
_ = res.Body.Close()
}

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package middleware
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// AuthThrottle limits repeated failing requests per client IP within a time
// window. It is meant for authentication-style endpoints (admin password auth,
// and any other endpoint where a caller repeatedly retries credentials) to slow
// brute-force without ever throttling a caller that succeeds.
//
// Only failures are counted, and the per-IP limit is checked before the wrapped
// handler runs, which gives two properties that matter for auth endpoints:
//
// - A caller presenting valid credentials is never throttled, even while a
// different source is actively brute-forcing: success does not accrue against
// the limit, and each source IP is counted independently.
// - Once an IP is over the limit its requests are rejected before the handler
// runs, so the response cannot reveal whether the submitted credentials were
// valid.
//
// It is safe for concurrent use. Wrap a handler with Middleware:
//
// throttle := middleware.NewAuthThrottle(10, time.Minute, nil)
// mux.Handle(path, throttle.Middleware(handler))
type AuthThrottle struct {
max int
window time.Duration
isFailure func(status int) bool
mu sync.Mutex
failures map[string]int
windowEnd time.Time
}
// authThrottleMapCap bounds the number of tracked IPs so a flood of requests with
// varying source addresses cannot grow the map without limit.
const authThrottleMapCap = 10000
// NewAuthThrottle creates an AuthThrottle allowing at most max failing requests
// per client IP within window, after which further requests from that IP are
// rejected with 429 until the window rolls over. isFailure decides, from the
// status the wrapped handler wrote, whether a request counts as a failure; if
// nil, any status >= 400 counts.
func NewAuthThrottle(max int, window time.Duration, isFailure func(status int) bool) *AuthThrottle {
if isFailure == nil {
isFailure = func(status int) bool { return status >= 400 }
}
return &AuthThrottle{
max: max,
window: window,
isFailure: isFailure,
failures: make(map[string]int),
}
}
// Middleware wraps h with per-IP failure throttling.
func (t *AuthThrottle) Middleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
retryAfter := strconv.Itoa(int(t.window.Seconds()))
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ip := clientIP(r)
if !t.allow(ip) {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAfter)
http.Error(w, "Too Many Requests", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
sw := &statusResponseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, status: http.StatusOK}
h.ServeHTTP(sw, r)
if t.isFailure(sw.Status()) {
t.recordFailure(ip)
}
})
}
// allow reports whether another request from ip may reach the handler. It rolls
// the window over, discarding accumulated counts once the window elapses.
func (t *AuthThrottle) allow(ip string) bool {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if now := time.Now(); now.After(t.windowEnd) {
t.failures = make(map[string]int)
t.windowEnd = now.Add(t.window)
}
return t.failures[ip] < t.max
}
// recordFailure counts one failed request from ip. New IPs are not tracked once
// the map is at capacity, keeping memory bounded under an address-varying flood.
func (t *AuthThrottle) recordFailure(ip string) {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if _, tracked := t.failures[ip]; !tracked && len(t.failures) >= authThrottleMapCap {
return
}
t.failures[ip]++
}
// clientIP derives the client address used as the throttle key.
//
// Forwarded headers are only trusted when the immediate socket peer is a private
// or loopback address, i.e. a local reverse proxy or load balancer (Centrifugo is
// commonly deployed behind one). For a direct public client the headers are
// client-controlled and ignored, so a peer cannot spoof them to evade throttling
// or lock out another IP. Header values are validated and canonicalized as IPs
// before use, so junk cannot inflate map keys or fragment the keyspace.
func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
peer := net.ParseIP(host)
if peer == nil || (!peer.IsLoopback() && !peer.IsPrivate()) {
return host
}
// Peer is a trusted local proxy: use the forwarded client address.
if ip := parseIP(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); ip != "" {
return ip
}
if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
if i := strings.IndexByte(fwd, ','); i >= 0 {
fwd = fwd[:i]
}
if ip := parseIP(strings.TrimSpace(fwd)); ip != "" {
return ip
}
}
return host
}
// parseIP returns the canonical string form of s if it is a valid IP, else "".
func parseIP(s string) string {
if s == "" {
return ""
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(s); ip != nil {
return ip.String()
}
return ""
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// goodPassword is accepted by the test handler; anything else returns 400.
const goodPassword = "correct"
func throttleTestHandler() http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Query().Get("pw") == goodPassword {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
return
}
http.Error(w, "bad", http.StatusBadRequest)
})
}
func doReq(h http.Handler, ip, pw string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/auth?pw="+pw, nil)
r.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:12345" // trusted local proxy peer, so X-Real-IP is honored.
r.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", ip)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return w
}
func TestAuthThrottle_LimitsFailuresPerIP(t *testing.T) {
h := NewAuthThrottle(3, time.Minute, nil).Middleware(throttleTestHandler())
// First 3 wrong attempts from an IP reach the handler and return its status.
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, doReq(h, "1.1.1.1", "wrong").Code, "attempt %d", i)
}
// The 4th is rejected before the handler runs, with a Retry-After hint.
resp := doReq(h, "1.1.1.1", "wrong")
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, resp.Code)
require.Equal(t, strconv.Itoa(60), resp.Header().Get("Retry-After"))
// Even a correct password from the throttled IP is rejected with 429, so the
// response does not reveal that the credentials were valid.
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, doReq(h, "1.1.1.1", goodPassword).Code)
}
func TestAuthThrottle_DoesNotBlockOtherIPsOrSuccess(t *testing.T) {
h := NewAuthThrottle(3, time.Minute, nil).Middleware(throttleTestHandler())
// Exhaust the limit for the attacker's IP.
for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
_ = doReq(h, "9.9.9.9", "wrong")
}
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, doReq(h, "9.9.9.9", "wrong").Code)
// A legitimate admin on a different IP still logs in while the attack runs.
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, doReq(h, "2.2.2.2", goodPassword).Code)
// Success never accrues against the limit: many valid logins stay allowed.
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, doReq(h, "3.3.3.3", goodPassword).Code, "login %d", i)
}
}
func TestAuthThrottle_PublicPeerCannotSpoofHeader(t *testing.T) {
h := NewAuthThrottle(3, time.Minute, nil).Middleware(throttleTestHandler())
// A direct public client rotating X-Real-IP cannot evade the limit: the header
// is untrusted (peer is not a local proxy), so every attempt keys on the real
// socket peer and the IP is throttled after the limit regardless of the header.
req := func(spoofedIP string) int {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/auth?pw=wrong", nil)
r.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.5:9999" // public peer.
r.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", spoofedIP)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return w.Code
}
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, req("1.1.1.1"))
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, req("2.2.2.2"))
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, req("3.3.3.3"))
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, req("4.4.4.4"))
}
func TestAuthThrottle_WindowReset(t *testing.T) {
h := NewAuthThrottle(2, 50*time.Millisecond, nil).Middleware(throttleTestHandler())
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, doReq(h, "1.2.3.4", "wrong").Code)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, doReq(h, "1.2.3.4", "wrong").Code)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, doReq(h, "1.2.3.4", "wrong").Code)
// After the window elapses the count resets and the IP may try again.
time.Sleep(70 * time.Millisecond)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, doReq(h, "1.2.3.4", "wrong").Code)
}
func TestAuthThrottle_MapBounded(t *testing.T) {
tr := NewAuthThrottle(1, time.Minute, nil)
// Track an IP, then flood the map with unique addresses past its capacity.
tr.recordFailure("10.0.0.1")
for i := 0; i < authThrottleMapCap+100; i++ {
tr.recordFailure("10.9." + strconv.Itoa(i/256) + "." + strconv.Itoa(i%256))
}
// The already-tracked IP keeps counting even though the map is now full.
tr.recordFailure("10.0.0.1")
tr.mu.Lock()
size := len(tr.failures)
pretrackedCount := tr.failures["10.0.0.1"]
tr.mu.Unlock()
require.LessOrEqual(t, size, authThrottleMapCap, "map must stay bounded")
require.Equal(t, 2, pretrackedCount, "already-tracked IP keeps counting")
}
func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
newReq := func(realIP, xff, remote string) *http.Request {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", nil)
r.RemoteAddr = remote
if realIP != "" {
r.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", realIP)
}
if xff != "" {
r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", xff)
}
return r
}
// Trusted local proxy peer (private / loopback): forwarded headers are used.
require.Equal(t, "5.5.5.5", clientIP(newReq("5.5.5.5", "1.1.1.1", "10.0.0.9:1")))
require.Equal(t, "1.1.1.1", clientIP(newReq("", "1.1.1.1, 2.2.2.2", "10.0.0.9:1")))
require.Equal(t, "8.8.8.8", clientIP(newReq("8.8.8.8", "", "127.0.0.1:1")))
// Direct public peer: forwarded headers are client-controlled, so ignored -
// the socket peer is used and a spoofed header cannot change the key.
require.Equal(t, "9.9.9.9", clientIP(newReq("", "", "9.9.9.9:12345")))
require.Equal(t, "9.9.9.9", clientIP(newReq("1.2.3.4", "1.2.3.4", "9.9.9.9:12345")))
// Behind a trusted proxy, a non-IP header value falls back to the peer, so an
// attacker cannot inflate map keys or fragment the keyspace with junk.
require.Equal(t, "10.0.0.9", clientIP(newReq(strings.Repeat("x", 5000), "", "10.0.0.9:1")))
require.Equal(t, "10.0.0.9", clientIP(newReq("", "not-an-ip", "10.0.0.9:1")))
require.Equal(t, "raw-addr", clientIP(newReq("", "", "raw-addr")))
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6/internal/config"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6/internal/metrics"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6/internal/tools"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifuge"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
"golang.org/x/time/rate"
)
var connLimitReachedLogLimiter = tools.NewIntervalLimiter(3 * time.Second)
type ConnLimit struct {
node *centrifuge.Node
cfgContainer *config.Container
rl *rate.Limiter
}
func NewConnLimit(node *centrifuge.Node, cfgContainer *config.Container) *ConnLimit {
rl := connectionRateLimiter(cfgContainer.Config().Client.ConnectionRateLimit)
return &ConnLimit{node: node, cfgContainer: cfgContainer, rl: rl}
}
func (l *ConnLimit) Middleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if l.rl != nil && !l.rl.Allow() {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
connLimit := l.cfgContainer.Config().Client.ConnectionLimit
if connLimit > 0 && l.node.Hub().NumClients() >= connLimit {
metrics.ConnLimitReached.Inc()
if connLimitReachedLogLimiter.Allow() {
log.Warn().Int("limit", connLimit).Msg("node connection limit reached")
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
func connectionRateLimiter(connRateLimit int) *rate.Limiter {
if connRateLimit > 0 {
return rate.NewLimiter(rate.Limit(connRateLimit), connRateLimit)
}
return nil
}

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package middleware
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6/internal/config"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6/internal/tools"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/time/rate"
)
func TestConnLimit_ConnectionRate(t *testing.T) {
node := tools.NodeWithMemoryEngineNoHandlers()
defer func() { _ = node.Shutdown(context.Background()) }()
cfg := config.DefaultConfig()
cfg.Client.ConnectionRateLimit = 10
cfgContainer, err := config.NewContainer(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
connLimit := NewConnLimit(node, cfgContainer)
require.Equal(t, rate.Limit(10), connLimit.rl.Limit())
require.Equal(t, 10, connLimit.rl.Burst())
ts := httptest.NewServer(connLimit.Middleware(testHandler()))
defer ts.Close()
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
res, err := http.Post(ts.URL, "application/json", nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
require.True(t, i >= 10)
return
}
}
require.Fail(t, "no rate limit hit upon sending 10 requests to a server")
}

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package middleware
import "net/http"
type OriginCheck func(r *http.Request) bool
// CORS middleware.
type CORS struct {
originCheck OriginCheck
}
func NewCORS(originCheck OriginCheck) *CORS {
return &CORS{originCheck: originCheck}
}
func (c *CORS) Middleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
header := w.Header()
if c.originCheck(r) {
header.Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", r.Header.Get("origin"))
if allowHeaders := r.Header.Get("Access-Control-Request-Headers"); allowHeaders != "" && allowHeaders != "null" {
header.Add("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", allowHeaders)
}
header.Set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true")
}
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}

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package middleware
import (
"context"
"net/http"
)
type contextHeadersKey struct{}
// GetHeadersFromContext returns http.Header from context.
func GetHeadersFromContext(ctx context.Context) (http.Header, bool) {
if val := ctx.Value(contextHeadersKey{}); val != nil {
values, ok := val.(http.Header)
return values, ok
}
return nil, false
}
func SetHeadersToContext(ctx context.Context, h http.Header) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextHeadersKey{}, h)
}
// HeadersToContext puts HTTP headers to request context.
func HeadersToContext(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r = r.WithContext(SetHeadersToContext(r.Context(), r.Header))
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6/internal/metrics"
)
// HTTPServerInstrumentation is a middleware to instrument HTTP handlers.
// Since it adds and extra layer of response wrapping Centrifugo doesn't use it by default.
// Note, we can not simply collect durations here because we have handlers with long-lived
// connections which require special care. So for now we just count requests.
func HTTPServerInstrumentation(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rw := &statusResponseWriter{w, http.StatusOK}
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
status := strconv.Itoa(rw.status)
// Use the matched route pattern, not the raw request path. Subtree
// handlers (admin, swagger, dev, debug) accept arbitrary client-controlled
// sub-paths, so labeling by r.URL.Path would grow the Prometheus series map
// without bound (memory DoS). r.Pattern is the registered pattern that
// matched (e.g. "/admin/"), so cardinality is bounded by the route count.
path := r.Pattern
if path == "" {
path = "other"
}
metrics.HTTPRequestsTotal.WithLabelValues(path, r.Method, status).Inc()
})
}

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package middleware
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// LogRequest middleware logs details of request.
func LogRequest(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
lrw := &statusResponseWriter{w, http.StatusOK}
h.ServeHTTP(lrw, r)
addr := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")
if addr == "" {
addr = r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
if addr == "" {
addr = r.RemoteAddr
}
}
log.Debug().Str("method", r.Method).Int("status", lrw.Status()).Str("path", r.URL.Path).Str("addr", addr).Str("duration", time.Since(start).String()).Msg("http request")
})
}
type statusResponseWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
status int
}
// WriteHeader allows us to save status code.
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
lrw.status = status
lrw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(status)
}
// Status code allows to get saved status code after handler finished its work.
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) Status() int {
if lrw.status == 0 {
return http.StatusOK
}
return lrw.status
}
// Hijack as we need it for Websocket.
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) {
lrw.status = http.StatusSwitchingProtocols
hijacker, ok := lrw.ResponseWriter.(http.Hijacker)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ResponseWriter doesn't support Hijacker interface")
}
return hijacker.Hijack()
}
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) HTTPStream() *http3.Stream {
return lrw.ResponseWriter.(http3.HTTPStreamer).HTTPStream()
}
// Flush implements http.Flusher.
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) Flush() {
lrw.ResponseWriter.(http.Flusher).Flush()
}
// Unwrap is required for http.ResponseController.
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
return lrw.ResponseWriter
}
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) ReceivedSettings() <-chan struct{} {
return lrw.ResponseWriter.(http3.Settingser).ReceivedSettings()
}
func (lrw *statusResponseWriter) Settings() *http3.Settings {
return lrw.ResponseWriter.(http3.Settingser).Settings()
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
)
// Post checks that handler called via POST HTTP method.
func Post(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return Method(http.MethodPost, h)
}
func Method(method string, h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != method {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp"
)
type OpenTelemetryHandler struct {
operation string
opts []otelhttp.Option
}
func NewOpenTelemetryHandler(operation string, opts []otelhttp.Option) *OpenTelemetryHandler {
return &OpenTelemetryHandler{operation: operation, opts: opts}
}
func (t *OpenTelemetryHandler) Middleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return otelhttp.NewHandler(h, t.operation, t.opts...)
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifuge"
)
// UserHeaderAuth is a middleware that extracts the value of user ID from the specific header
// and sets connection credentials.
func UserHeaderAuth(userHeaderName string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID := r.Header.Get(userHeaderName)
if userID != "" {
ctx := centrifuge.SetCredentials(r.Context(), &centrifuge.Credentials{
UserID: userID,
})
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
}
// Call the next handler
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}

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package middleware
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/centrifugal/centrifuge"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func userHeaderAuthTestHandler(t *testing.T, userMustBeSet bool) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
cred, ok := centrifuge.GetCredentials(r.Context())
if userMustBeSet {
require.True(t, ok, "credentials should be set")
require.Equal(t, "123", cred.UserID, "user ID should be set correctly")
} else {
require.False(t, ok)
}
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("OK"))
})
}
func TestUserHeaderAuthWithUserID(t *testing.T) {
middleware := UserHeaderAuth("X-User-ID")
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
req.Header.Set("X-User-ID", "123")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler := middleware(userHeaderAuthTestHandler(t, true))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "status code should be 200 OK")
}
func TestUserHeaderAuthWithoutUserID(t *testing.T) {
middleware := UserHeaderAuth("X-User-ID")
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler := middleware(userHeaderAuthTestHandler(t, false))
handler.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rr.Code, "status code should be 200 OK")
}